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Risk and Decision Making:
The “Logic” of Probability
Manfred Borovcnik
Alpen-Adria University, Klagenfurt, Austria
Abstract: Risk is a hot topic. There is an international trend to use examples of risk or the concept of risk in the
early teaching of probability. It enriches the problems, it widens the contexts, and it motivates the students to
learn probability. This paper illustrates the notion of risk as a multi-faceted concept. The diverse perceptions start
with language where risk is used in very different ways. The overlap of risk and hazard is not restricted to the
technical context of safety and reliability; Knight’s seminal work on risk and uncertainty has its definite impact on
today’s perception of the notions. The endeavour to re-interpret issues of statistical inference by risk – the risk of
type I and II errors – or the concept of the weighted impact of decisions (in decision theory and in Bayesian
framework) can clarify what risk means within mathematics but – as the whole machinery of statistical inference
is difficult to understand – it may have little consequence on how the majority of people act and understand the
notion of risk. Kahneman and Tversky show that the perception of risk is influenced by psychological factors and
assert that people are risk averse in winning situations while they are risk seeking in losing situations. The
perception of risk is dominated by the impact (loss or win) so that even a thorough judgement of the underlying
probabilities is biased. If risk is shared between several stakeholders, they all have to use their own ingredients for
their model of the same situation and follow their own logic. This leads to non-unique answers, which is unusual
in mathematics. Methods of simplifying problems, the way to find a solution, and understand the underlying
concepts more easily may induce a shift from a refined perception of the (hypothetical) models involved towards
factual knowledge. The article aims to clarify these issues, which influence the ways to conceptualize, perceive,
and teach the notion of risk.
Keywords: risk, uncertainty, risk perception, decision making, statistical errors, Bayesian risk, minimax
principle.

Introduction
The reader might think that risk has a well-defined meaning and can be taught straightforwardly.
The following discussion illustrates how risk can enrich probability teaching but reminds us that
deliberate learning paths have to be designed so that teaching can enhance the ideas of risk in the
learners. Modelling requires a different “logic” adapted to the problem being modelled and its context,
which seems surprising for many as they do not perceive such diversity in mathematics and are also
surprised that probability does not follow logical rules such as transitivity. In an earlier paper on risk in
health we found it necessary to define risk right at the beginning of the essay:
“By risk we understand a situation with inherent uncertainty about the (future) outcomes, which
is related to impact (cost, damage, or benefit). Sometimes expected value is used for comparing
several decisions, which are ‘at stake’. Risk is used heterogeneously, some refer only to the
probability inherent to one adverse outcome without regarding its impact, and others refer only
to the adverse outcome. A decision between several choices of action might involve one person,
or a decision might be ‘shared’ between two or more stakeholders, e.g., a patient and a doctor
who have to find a decision about the next steps. […] Risk involves two components and both
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are prone to subjective interpretations: the judgment of impact is different for different
individuals and is even more distinct for a person or an institution with a role different from the
patient.” (Borovcnik, & Kapadia, 2011a, p.1)
However, one reviewer criticized our usage of the term “risk” and stated that by risk only the
adverse future outcome can be meant. This would also be reflected by sentences like “The operation
bears the risk of …”, “I do not climb in the mountains as the risk of an accident is ...”, “No risk – no
fun”. This shows that there is no unique concept of risk and we became aware that there are other
feasible ways to define and think about risk instead of a precise definition.
Therefore, we start with a discussion of various meanings of risk and also refer to concepts
linked to risk and describe situations that involve risk. In the second section we identify statistical
notions of risk, which include type I and type II errors of statistical tests and Bayesian risk. The third
section is devoted to psychological aspects of risk and perception of risk. We continue with three
paradigmatic examples of risk that develop genuine features of risk and enrich the notion of probability
by their context. In a further section, elementary approaches to probability are intended to make sense of
risk involved in specific situations. A special view on the stakeholders that are possibly brought together
in decision making corroborates our view that there are many ways to model and describe risk, and they
all yield feasible descriptions of the situations involved but may differ in character and in what is
regarded as the best decision. Implications for teaching complete the multifaceted character of risk that
we project by our considerations.
Meanings of Risk
In this section, we deal with various ways to define risk, which is unusual from a mathematical
perspective, where definitions are usually agreed. Furthermore, the meaning of risk – regardless of the
specific definition – is also influenced by the character of probability information that is used for
determining risk. We also go into details about relations between risk and hazard, between risk and
uncertainty, and risk and utility. This section concludes with an analysis of situations that involve risk.
The constituent parts of such situations (like who takes a risk) influence the interpretation of the input
information as well as the meaning of the calculated risk.
Attempts to Define Risk
Apart from the vague use of “risk” in everyday language, risk is perceived and defined also in
the scientific context. The common element between science and everyday seems to be an unwanted
event that may or may not occur, often related to a low probability and severe consequences. Hansson
(2007) discriminates five definitions of risk:
(1) “an unwanted event which may or may not occur”;
(2) “the cause of an unwanted event which may or may not occur”;
(3) “the probability of an unwanted event which may or may not occur”;
(4) “the statistical expectation value of an unwanted event which may or may not occur”;
(5) “the fact that a decision is made under conditions of known [rather than unknown]
probabilities”.
An early definition of “risk” in the sense of (5) has been attempted by Knight (1921) who made
the term very popular; his use has its roots in economic settings (see below). Generally, the use of
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probability, which is also controversial, is essential for the perception and interpretation of risk. Indeed,
we refer to the three main classifications of probability in Borovcnik and Kapadia (2014), which are
useful to clarify discussions on probability-related issues. We argue that all three approaches should be
introduced in teaching probability. We will use this helpful classification throughout the paper and hope
that others involved in teaching probability will use this terminology.
APT: A priori theory – probability is identified by equal probabilities in a finite probability space
(Laplace theory).
FQT: Frequentist theory – probability is linked (determined, defined) by the limit of relative
frequencies.
SJT: Subjectivist theory – probability is the personal degree of belief of a person in an uncertain
statement.
There is an axiomatic justification for each approach and its inherent interpretation. The three
approaches have led to fierce controversies and disputes historically. This is partly because there are
restrictions for each of them. There are no situations with equal probabilities, there is no limit of relative
frequencies in the finite series of experiments in the real world, and the “elicitation of probabilities” is
too subjective for many people. Besides and along all these approaches, probability is also used as a
scenario term to investigate a real problem on the basis “what happens if ...” (see Borovcnik, 2006;
2011). An example of the use of the scenario idea is the following:
How many redundant technical units (built in a system in parallel so that all have to fail for the
system to fail) are required to attain an acceptable risk (probability) of failure of the system if the
reliability (probability of functioning) of single units is 0.95 and the failures are independent?
Mathematically, one can calculate the system’s reliability as 1−0.05n and compare the increase in
reliability to the increase in cost and decide about a reasonable balancing point. The values calculated
allow for a transparent decision but are not to be taken literally as approximating any realistic
probability (neither as property of single units nor of the system).
The meaning (4) about risk is the one preferred in technical environments dealing with the
reliability of systems. It seems more objective and thus widely communicable or compulsive. However,
its relevance still depends on the actual probabilities involved. There might be limited documentation
about failures of units, there might be only qualitative statements of engineers (from stress tests under
conditions of highly elevated stress levels, which have an effect on shorter life time and earlier failures),
and there might be only general considerations of redundancy as in the scenario above. In cases when
there is a very low probability of failure of a unit (which is often true), there are no failures to observe in
real life under normal conditions so that any probability is a scenario figure.
Though the discussion of risk has been initiated by Knight in an economic setting, the technical
usage of risk has been made popular by early studies on nuclear reactor safety (Rasmussen et al., 1975).
It is important to regard the character of probabilities involved in risks that are communicated as well as
the precision of knowledge on the probabilities used to calculate the risk. To speak in terms of risk about
probabilistic situations is just a twist in language. Similar problems have been dealt with since the early
beginnings of probability. And they have led to unsolvable paradoxes like the St Petersburg paradox, in
which the fair stakes of a bet are derived as an infinite amount (see Borovcnik, & Kapadia, 2014). This
also prompted considerations of the utility of money for the first time, by which the expected value of
the game turns to the risk in the sense of (4). The change of terms, however, reflects also a change of
applications of probability, especially to the economy (where risk is an inherent component of actions)
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and reliability and safety considerations in technology (where risk is also shared between stakeholders of
unequal access to influencing the decision).
Risk and Hazard
Various dictionaries (like Merriam-Webster) also link the adverse event with the potential
underlying cause and subsume it under the heading of “risk”, such as the possibility that something bad
or unpleasant (such as an injury or a loss) will happen, someone or something that may cause something
bad or unpleasant to happen, or a person or thing that someone judges to be a good or bad choice for
insurance, or a loan.
There are key differences in the five definitions in the previous section. In (1) there is an
unwanted event; in (3) it is the probability of an adverse event; a summary figure for risk occurs in (4);
in (2), risk is something that may cause an adverse event. There is a subtle difference of wording in (1)
and (2) with the latter focusing on the factors behind, which might cause the harm. Such factors are
called hazards. However, usage of the notion hazard is diverse outside technical contexts. Often
dictionaries do not give specific definitions of it or combine it with the term “risk”. For example, one
dictionary defines hazard as “a danger or risk” or refers risk back to hazard which helps explain why
many people use all the terms interchangeably and contribute to the confusion. Relating to workplaces,
CCOHS (n.d.) states: “A hazard is any source of potential damage, harm or adverse health effects on
something or someone under certain conditions at work.” Examples of hazards at the workplace are
materials like asbestos that may cause mesothelioma, or substances like benzene that may cause
leukaemia.
In this setting, hazard becomes what earlier has been subsumed in (2) as risk, and risk becomes
the chance or probability that a person will be harmed if exposed to the underlying hazard; this is (3),
not (4). Risk assessment becomes the process of identifying hazards and evaluating the risk associated to
the specific hazard; risk management is then any measurement to eliminate or control hazards at an
acceptable level.
The problem with hazards is that they are linked via probabilities or chance to the adverse events.
If the effect is acute (with immediate consequences) the link back to the hazard is obvious. However,
more often the effect is chronic and delayed so that a link is hard to establish and it is difficult to provide
evidence for. Potential hazards are statistically identified by correlations or associations (ex post
exposure rates) and rarely can a causal link be established. That makes it very difficult to convince
people about (potential) hazards.
When we study the relationship between smoking and the occurrence of lung cancer, we notice
that the percentage of people with lung cancer is greater in those who have smoked earlier; that indicates
that it is better not to smoke in the sense of doing something in order not get lung cancer. However, this
association cannot directly be interpreted in causal terms as we cannot exclude third factors (hidden
variables) operating in the background. One factor may be problems in handling stress that can lead
people to smoke and at the same time make them more prone to lung cancer.
Another, simpler example illustrates the dilemma. If in the world-ski championship the Austrian
skiers win one third of the medals, then we cannot infer from this fact that one third of the Austrian
skiers are serious candidates for medals. They are not all the same, which is the basic assumption in the
cancer example from before. They differ by third variables that might affect their success (disease
above). This illustrates that cause and effect cannot simply be exchanged. Statistical methods are
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specially designed to corroborate statistical evidence; they indicate in which cases it may be rewarding
to search for contextual interrelationships but cannot provide a substitute for such research.
Knight’s Distinction of Risk from Uncertainty
According to Knight “risk” and “uncertainty” differ by the character of probability: if the
underlying probabilities are not known, then Knight speaks of “decisions under uncertainty”, if they are
known then he calls them decisions of “risk”. This distinction clearly implies that risk excludes
uncertainty, i.e., once the probabilities (and the impact) for the various events are estimated, uncertainty
(or lack of any knowledge) is eliminated from the situation. Knight’s terminology has been so successful
as – on the surface – it shifts the connotation of risk away from uncertainty (in the general sense) and
makes the term “risk” seemingly more objective and thus more acceptable, which may be advantageous.
The original quotation is:
The essential fact is that ‘risk’ means in some cases a quantity susceptible of measurement, while
at other times it is something distinctly not of this character; […] It will appear that a measurable
uncertainty, or ‘risk’ proper […] is so far different from an unmeasurable one that it is not in
effect an uncertainty at all. We shall accordingly restrict the term ‘uncertainty’ to cases of the
non-quantitative type. (Knight, 1921, pp.19)
However, there are several objections. The use of “uncertainty” by Knight conflicts with its use
in probability and philosophy. Philosophically, uncertainty (or chance) is opposed to determinism.
Uncertainty is the general term designating (random) situations where a precise prediction of an
outcome cannot be made with certainty, i.e., where probability has to be used in the prediction. Whether
or not it is possible to get good estimates or relevant hypothetical values of the probabilities involved
does not matter as the character of the probabilities (APT, FQT, or SJT) is not relevant. As the future is
always uncertain, a risk is attached to actions relating to it.
A second objection is that Knight adopts a very naive usage of probability as – apart from
textbook examples – probabilities are not known: even in games of chances there is always the dispute
whether the conditions of a Laplace experiment with equal likelihood are in fact fulfilled in a specific
case. Two other positions can also be stated: either (following von Mises) that probabilities are always
only partially known and have to be estimated (FQT), and, probability does not exist in the objective
world and is only part of our judgement on the world (SJT), as espoused by de Finetti. What we know is
that the numbers are related to the models (e.g., an equiprobability model for a die yields 1/6 for each of
the faces in the sense of APT probability) or estimates from past experience (FQT probability). Or, we
know the values from elicitation from a person’s preference system (SJT probability).
A third objection is that from a subjectivist viewpoint the consistent choices of a rational person
yield his or her subjective probabilities. Thus, while we have no precise values for probabilities (in FQT
sense) we have probabilities (in SJT sense) and therefore the distinction between risk and uncertainty is
not valid as noted by Friedman (1976, p.282).
Uncertainty has to be met by suitable procedures to get estimates or qualitative knowledge on the
unknown probabilities. Of course, the status and the precision of probabilities that are used to calculate
risks in the sense of (4) heavily influences the possible interpretation of this risk and its relevance for a
discussion, especially if it relates to different stakeholders as is in the public discussion of safety of
nuclear power or in public health issues. Of course, the more frequentist information about the
underlying probabilities is available, the more objective seems to be the calculated risk. However, still
there might be a dispute as different stakeholders can (and have to) exploit different information for their
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purposes and they also “suffer” and benefit differently from the various actions to avoid the inherent risk
(see Borovcnik, & Kapadia, 2011b).
Today, researchers defend the Knightian distinction between risk and uncertainty by saying that
Knight did in fact link uncertainty to situations where markets collapse and so no subjective
probabilities can be found (LeRoy, & Singell, 1987).
Knight was a key person in founding the Chicago School of Economics (with 3 Nobel Prize awards) and
his ideas about risk and uncertainty have influenced many people. One example may illustrate how they
express their ideas in Knight’s tradition:
“Risk: We don’t know what is going to happen next, but we do know what the distribution looks
like. Uncertainty: We don’t know what is going to happen next, and we do not know what the
possible distribution looks like. In other words […] the future is always unknown — but that
does not make it ‘uncertain’.” (Ritholtz, n.d.)
This view on the financial markets from a former trader, researcher and strategist, and now asset
manager reflects a desire of eliminating uncertainty and arrive at objective figures for probabilities: there
is risk but no uncertainty, and we have everything under control. This wording induces a misleading
impression of the measurements taken or possible and reflects the fact that “experts” adopt a
terminology that fits their purpose (rather than suiting their client’s interests).
Risk and Utility in Economic Theory
Risk is a key factor for economic activities and is the basic element for decisions on financial
markets, which resembles the old paradigm of bets. In modelling economic activities, risk plays a central
role therefore. If actions with the same expected utility are compared according to (4), the one with the
larger variance is defined as more risky. Risky behaviour can then be described by properties of the
utility function; to be risk averse means to prefer that one of two actions (with the same expected utility),
which has less variance (in utility). The degree of risk aversion may be measured by the person’s
willingness to pay to get one option over the other that is offered. The Arrow-Pratt measure of risk
aversion is defined as −u′′(x)/u′(x) (u(x) the utility function, which is presumed to be twice
differentiable); the higher this value the more risk averse is the person.
Apart from theoretical frames like expected utility as the criterion for decisions, researchers also
became interested in how people behave in comparison to normative theories and explain – mainly by
reference to psychology – why they deviate from normative results. Kahneman and Tversky are famous
for their experiments, in which they investigated how people really behave in simplified situations.
People seem to replace utility by an asymmetric function and put much more weight on the tails of the
probability scale, i.e., differences in probability have much more influence on actions when they relate
to very small and very large probabilities as compared to probabilities in the middle (around 0.50).
Tversky and Kahneman (1986) developed the so-called prospect theory to describe how actual
behaviour deviates from theoretical models of rational behaviour under risk (for their experiments see
below).
Analytic Investigation of Situations that Involve Risk
So far we have reviewed different concepts (1) to (5) to define risk and to discern risk from
neighbouring concepts. The adverse events bear subjective components in two ways: their probabilities
are not always judged by objective (FQT) information and the evaluation of impact may be biased by
personal circumstances. A fuller comprehension of the mathematical concepts as well as psychological
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factors may play a key role in processing the available information (in the extreme case even apparently
objective information is just ignored or reinterpreted). We will deal with these issues separately below.
From a systems analytic approach, it does not suffice to define risk but it is essential to structure
those situations that involve risk: which constituents build up a risky situation and how do they influence
the way to deal with risk or the perception of risk? Borovcnik and Kapadia (2011b) refer to the
following ingredients of a decision situation related to health: “the nature of the risk (and mathematical
concepts like probability); the psychological matters involved; the type of situation (treatment,
prevention) and information used; the people involved, their aims (purpose) and their inherent criteria”.
These are general categories to describe risky situations.
Risk may involve only the decision maker who takes personal risks like travelling, smoking,
nutrition, or personal health issues. A decision between alternatives is influenced by a subjective
judgement of a balance between benefits and adverse effects. Decisions may also bring two or more
stakeholders together, which typically is the case in (public) health. It is important to note that the
stakeholders do not use the same information, or the same criteria to process the information, and they
are also affected quite differently by the outcome. While a patient personally might suffer from
consequences (no cure, side effects of treatment), the doctor is liable to the system to guarantee
treatment according to the state of art. Other stakeholders in public health (including the media) still
experience other impact and follow other optimizing criteria; for the dilemma resulting from the
interests of the various stakeholders see Borovcnik and Kapadia (2011a, b). It is clear that the different
stakeholders have to use different criteria to find or justify their decisions. Remarkable, however, is the
inconsistent use of criteria by individual decision makers (see below).
The type of the situation is a further, often neglected influence factor on the perception of risk:
there are “real” risks when an acute situation is there and some action has to be undertaken; think of an
accident with a broken ankle. While there are several options, something has to be done to deal with the
immediate situation. Sometimes there are virtual risks relating to the (far) future. The person might
conceive cancer of the prostate. There are hazards lurking in the background but no direct link can be
made to the adverse event. In public health, screening programmes have been installed for various
diseases: mammography with breast cancer (see Gigerenzer, 2002, for general risk considerations in this
case); or, PSA tests and biopsies with prostate cancer (see Sandblom, et al, 2011, for an attempt to
evaluate the success of the programme). Another virtual risk is climate change. Whether or not there is a
climate change, whether or not such a change will have adverse effects directly related to it, there is
much effort and investment of money in an attempt to decrease the “identified” hazards for a climate
change.
Statistical Notions of Risk
In this section we present statistical terms that – implicitly – deal with risk, or, vice versa, that
build up a normative way to conceptualize risk. Risk is linked to the possibility and probability that a
statistical test leads to a wrong “decision” and is identified as conditional probability. The Bayesian
approach to conceptualize risk is linked to an expected loss argument. We also discuss the problems that
arise from low probabilities as we have no data for such situations so that the decisions (and related
risks) based on them lack empirical justifications.
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Type I and Type II Errors
In the historical development of statistical tests, Neyman and Pearson used a decision theoretic
framework. In the simplest case we have two probability distributions for a phenomenon and we do not
know, which distribution really applies. We decide in favour of one after we see the data from a random
sample from the “true” distribution.
Example from quality control. A production line fabricates items that have an average rate of
defectives of p = 0.04 if the process is under control. If there is a disruption in the process, the
proportion of defectives increases. We restrict the possible values from p > 0.04 to p1 = 0.10 ; i.e., 10 %
defectives are produced on average in this case. We have now two hypotheses; the null hypothesis H0:
p0 = 0.04 and the alternative hypothesis H1: p1 = 0.10 and we search for a reasonable decision rule if
we inspect a sample of n = 100 items from the current production. The situation is represented in Table 1.
Status

H0: p0 = 0.04
Production is under control

H1: p1 = 0.10
Production is out of control

Decision
T0: do not reject (“accept”) H0

T1: reject H0

Decision is correct

Type I error
H0 is erroneously rejected though
it is true
The production has been stopped
yet everything was okay

Type II error
H0 is not rejected even though H1
is true
A serious disturbance of the
production has not been detected

Decision is correct

Table 1. Risk of wrong decisions in a statistical test of the null hypothesis H0 against an
alternative H1
There is a risk of wrong decisions in the sense of (1) as Neyman and Pearson formulated in their
papers. The probabilities of wrong decisions (the adverse event) are conditional probabilities
(conditional to the distributions in the null and alternative hypotheses). These probabilities of wrong
decisions are often denoted by α and β and can be called risks in the sense of definition (3):
P(T1 | H0 : p0 = 0.04) = α and P(T0 | H1 : p1 = 0.10) = β . The decisions T0 and T1 are based on the
number X of defectives in the sample that is inspected. By the usual assumptions, X is binomially
distributed with n (=100 here) and p0 = 0.04 if H0 and p1 = 0.10 if H1 is true. From here we can
calculate α and β if we use a threshold of X = 8 for our decision, i.e., if we reject H0 if X ≥ 8 (T1) and
do not reject H0 if X ≤ 7 (T0).
P( X ≥ 8 | p0 = 0.04) = 0.0475 and P( X ≤ 7 | p1 = 0.10) = 0.2061. Usually, the type I error is preset (often to 0.05. or 0.01) so that the threshold can be calculated and the type II error is dependent on
the size of the type I error. In this setting we cannot obtain probabilities for wrong decisions, which are
P( H 0 | T1 ) and P( H1 | T0 ) . In FQT view, hypotheses cannot have probabilities as there is no experiment
for them (and therefore no relative frequencies); in SJT view, hypotheses have probabilities as any
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(unknown) statement or event does have a probability but as long as the probabilities are not “elicited”
the probabilities of wrong decisions are not known.
Errors of type I and II are interpreted by the following thought experiment (scenario; under
laboratory conditions): If the null hypothesis always applies, then it will be rejected with probability α,
that is, in 100 α % of cases applying the test, the null hypothesis will erroneously be rejected. For our
production line example this means that for α = 0.05 the production will be stopped in 5% (on average)
to search for specific causes but the production definitely is under control. If β = 0.20, then the
production would not be stopped though the conditions of the alternative hypothesis apply. For the
production line this means that – if the production is out of control and items are produced with an
average rate of defectives of p1 = 10 % – the decision rule would not “recognize” that with probability
0.20 and let the production continue.
Such a primitive FQT interpretation is misleading as one never tests under laboratory conditions
and it provokes an interpretation of α as an error rate that conveys something on the risk of wrong
decisions. As we know that it is not an unconditional probability, we change the names and refer to the
risk rather than the probability of a type I error. Taken literally, the pure FQT position leads to
rationality gaps, which have been fiercely criticized in the controversy about the foundations of statistics
(see Stegmüller, 1973, or Hacking, 1975, 1990). Thus, the type I error should be interpreted as
qualitative figure that is needed to derive the threshold and the type II error is just a mathematical
consequence of it. If it seems too large (as here), then more data should be sampled before the decision
is made. The Bayesian approach would compare various decision rules according to expected loss in the
sense of (4). We will see the approach at work in the example on journal copies later.
Fisher suggested to test a null hypothesis against data from a random sample and insisted on not
to formulate a specific alternative hypothesis. Instead, he based his decision of rejecting the null
hypothesis on the p-value, which is the probability of getting a sample statistic (say, a sample mean) as
far as, or further (more extreme) from some reference value (which reflects the true population
parameter). Fisher thought that the p-value could be interpreted as a discrepancy measure from the null
hypothesis. Thus, the p-value would be interpreted as error probability of the test. However, as we have
seen in our framework above, it reflects only the probability of erroneously rejecting a true null
hypothesis, i.e., P(T1 | H 0 ) and not the probability of an error in decision making if we reject the null
hypothesis, which is P(H 0 | T1 ) . Thus it is misleading to associate the risk of a wrong decision with the
p-value.
In the early attempts to formulate his ideas about significance tests, Fisher pre-sets the
significance level α and rejects the null hypothesis if its p-value is lower than α. In comparison to the
Neyman-Pearson test policy, this significance level coincides with the type I error. However, the
significance test lacks information about specific alternatives and their related type II errors (β). The
complement 1− β is also known as the power of a test and conveys information about the probability that
the test can “detect” a specific deviation from the null hypothesis if such a deviating hypothesis would
actually be the true distribution for the investigated phenomenon. The power is a key concept to judge
the risks associated to a statistical test.
While there are strong arguments for Neyman-Pearson’s view, in practice an alternative can
often not be formulated like in the ANOVA case, when one has not yet a clear idea about the structure
of the differences in mean between the tested populations and it is methodologically doubtful to extract
hypotheses from the same data, which are used to test these hypotheses; or, in testing for independence,
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where it is difficult to formulate specific hypotheses for dependence. Yet, Lehman (1993) tried to
reconcile both approaches towards testing.
Risks with Low Probabilities
For events with very low probabilities, we have no data available and thus any FQT
consideration is doubtful. What remains is an elicitation of subjective probabilities or the use
probabilities in a scenario to investigate the issue on a “what if” basis. We illustrate the difficulty of
getting reliable data for low probabilities by an example from Borovcnik (2012, p.22). Normally, an
unknown probability is estimated by the related relative frequencies from a sample that is assumed to be
random. This latter assumption is hard to meet, hardly questioned, and really difficult to check (a test for
randomness lacks an alternative and therefore, a type II error cannot be calculated). Such an estimate has
an inherent variability. Suppose, we want to investigate how we can get information for a probability p
of 10-4. If we base an estimate of p on a sample of “10,000 there is a 36.8% chance to get no one with
the property with an estimate of pˆ = 0 , a further 36.8% for an estimate of pˆ = 0.0001 (exact), 18.4% for
an estimate of pˆ = 0.0002 (doubles the value), 6.1% for pˆ = 0.0003 (triples it) and 1.9% for an estimate
more than four times the underlying value”.
Another example is bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE, or mad cow disease), taken from
Dubben and Beck-Bornholdt (2010, pp.64). There were times when all of Europe was in uproar because
of news on new “cases” of BSE. Cattle with the disease are a hazard as those who eat their meat may
contract Jacob-Creutzfeldt disease. Tests have been undertaken to evaluate the accuracy of diagnosing
whether an animal has or does not have the disease. With the diagnosis test applied, a cattle gets the
attribute positive T + (indicating the disease) or negative T − (indicating that the animal is free of this
disease). If the cattle has BSE, there is a “sensitivity” of (at least 0.99) that it will get a positive test
result; if the cattle has no BSE, there is a “specifity” of (at least) 0.997 that it will get a negative test
result. Both sensitivity and specifity are conditional probabilities: sensitivity = P (T + | BSE ) ; specifity =
P(T − | no BSE ) .
These properties of the diagnosing procedure have been based on testing 300 infected cattle from
British origin and from 1,000 animals from disease-free New Zealand. And in German laboratories all
1,300 biometric samples have been classified correctly, from where the properties above have been
calculated by means of confidence intervals. However, put it the other way round and calculate the
probability that 1,000 non-infected cattle are classified correctly as T − given that the specifity is 0.997:
to classify them all negative, there is – merely by chance – a probability of 5%. The extraordinary test
result may thus be explained by mere randomness.
This reduces the 100% security of the laboratory test considerably. And, furthermore, remember
that it is much more difficult to detect the still latent disease when no apparent traces of it are there than
it is to confirm the disease (by the same diagnosing test) of a full-blown BSE cattle. That is, under
conditions of mass application the careful procedure of the laboratory test may not be upheld. A cattle
classified positive need not be infected; we cannot claim that with certainty. Likewise, a cattle classified
negative need not be disease-free. To calculate the probability that a cattle with diagnosis T + in fact has
BSE, we need also the prevalence of BSE in the population of German cattle. This is an unknown
number. While there are subjective estimates, there is no objective number.
There were 331 cases of positive tests in Germany from January 2001 till June 2004 when
9,747,738 cattle have been tested. That means the prevalence is less than 3 out of 100,000. It could well
be that this number is much lower and all the positive test results have been false positives. We will
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never know. This illustrates drastically the problem with hazards that have a low probability to cause
harm. As the impact is high (human beings may contract a deadly disease), societal rationality is put
under enormous stress.
Another issue arising from low probabilities is that we underestimate cumulative risk. Suppose
there is a personal risk in climbing. For one trip a risk might be calculated in the sense of (3) of 0.0001,
which is negligible. For 2,000 trips the probability of not being involved in the adverse event attached to
it is calculated to 0.99992,000 whence the cumulative risk is 18%. What if the initial risk is 0.0003 (which
is still a negligible number)? The cumulative risk rises to 45%. Who would have expected that effect?
The difficulty in understanding such calculations means that the cumulative risk is neglected though it is
essential.
Psychological Aspects of Risk
Risk involves the probabilities of several outcomes and their impact. The probabilities may attain
a more subjective (SJT) or a stronger objective (FQT) character. The impact can be measured by
“money” or utility; the latter has a strong subjective component. It is interesting to know whether people
share similar forms of utility and how far they are consistent between different choices they make. A
further key issue is whether people behave rationally or are influenced by psychological factors. The
criteria people choose might be dependent on their perception of risk, which may be influenced by
context, by low probabilities, or by high impact. Surprisingly, there are arguments to change the
criterion for decisions depending on whether a decision is made once or made repeatedly. We start with
some famous experiments of Kahneman and Tversky.
Probability and Utility
Kahneman and Tversky conducted many experiments with adults on understanding probability
and risk and showed how inconsistent people are with regards to uncertainty. They characterised their
behaviour as misconceptions and formulated a terminology: representativeness, availability, anchoring,
etc. The examples used to explore people’s behaviour resemble the following one though some are more
complicated (Kahneman, & Tversky, 1979; Tversky, & Kahneman, 1981).
Experiment 1: Win [in $]
Potential future
Experiment 2: Win [in $]
Potential future

Option a1
1,000
Option a3
−1,000

Option a2
2,500 with ½
0 with ½
Option a4
−2,500 with ½
0 with ½

Table 2. Type of experiments, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) used for their studies
In experiment 1 (see Table 2) people prefer $ 1,000 for sure even if the second option has a value
of 1,250 while in experiment 2 people prefer the second option and seek the risk rather than the sure loss
of $ −1,000. In winning situations people are risk averse. People prefer $ 1,000 for sure even if the
second option has a value of 1,250. On the contrary, in losing situations people are risk seeking: they
prefer the second option with a value of −1,250 and seek the risk rather than the sure loss of −1,000.
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“Problems […] demonstrate that outcomes which are obtained with certainty are overweighed
relative to uncertain outcomes. In the positive domain, the certainty effect contributes to a risk
averse preference for a sure gain over a larger gain that is merely probable. In the negative
domain, the same effect leads to a risk seeking preference for a loss that is merely probable over
a smaller loss that is certain. The same psychological principle – the overweighting of certainty –
favours risk aversion in the domain of gains and risk seeking in the domain of losses.”
(Kahneman, & Tversky, 1979, pp. 268)
In developing prospect theory Kahneman and Tversky (1979) found that the decisions observed
in their experiments are incompatible with expected utility theory that has been proposed as normative
theory of behaviour in view of risk by Neumann and Morgenstern (1953) and widely used as a model to
describe economic behaviour (Arrow, 1971). In 2002, Kahneman was awarded a Nobel Prize for his
work on the psychology of decision making (of which prospect theory is a foundational part).
With the usual utility functions (concave for positive and convex for negative values of money),
such behaviour is inconsistent. That implies also that people have to act in the experiment as if it were
real which is doubtful as in virtual games decisions are different from the hard consequences of real life
where no switch-off button exists. The method also requires that people can disentangle the perception
of probabilities and utility considerations; however, the perception of any probability is always linked to
its impact (the probability of an event with a severe negative impact is often highly over-estimated).
Furthermore, Kahneman and Tversky only described the phenomenon that has since become famous:
people are risk-averse in winning situations and are risk-seeking in losing situations. They did not
explain this behaviour by their analyses.
We will twist the representation of the experiments by a reformulation, which changes the
character of the winning situation to a losing situation and vice versa. By this we show that the
representation of a situation is not unique and implications of the behaviour cannot easily be drawn.
Furthermore, we will explain the behaviour, which seems obvious in the new format. And, the result can
be reconciled with utility with a somewhat different utility function, which has not yet been considered
but seems relevant (one that is bounded from below and the lower bound is reached very “soon”)
especially if one investigates ongoing political and financial decisions around the rescue of the Euro
since 2008.
Experiment 1 can be formulated differently. People think of $ 1,000 for sure as they have it
already with option a1. The decision for a2 then appears as relative to the status quo as potential losing
situation as they imagine losing $ 1,000. Instead of comparing a1 and a2, they compare a1 and a2*. This
sheds doubt on Kahneman and Tversky’s hypothesis “in winning situations people are risk averse”
(Table 3) and “in losing situations people are risk seeking” (Table 4).
Experiment 1*
Potential future

Option a1
1,000

Option a2*

Option a2

1,500 with ½

2,500 with ½

−1,000 with ½

0 with ½

Table 3. Reformulation of experiment 1 from a winning to a losing situation
The possibility of winning an extra amount of only $ 1,500 is now related to the additional risk
to lose the 1,000 and go down to zero! It may not pay to risk the 1,000 for the small extra win of 1,500.
The situation may thus be perceived as losing situation. A person that has already 1,000 has to be paid
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(much) more to take a risk to lose 1,000. The more a person already owns, the more this person has to be
paid to seek the risk.
Experiment 2*
Potential future

Option a3
−1,000

Option a4*

Option a4

−1,500 with ½

−2,500 with ½

1,000 with ½

0 with ½

Table 4. Reformulation of experiment 2 from a losing to a winning situation
In the same way we can reformulate the situation of the second experiment and regard the option
relative to the status of having already lost 1,000. The situation is now a winning situation. People who
already have debts will take more risks to balance them. In our own experiments with students for these
tables, we have found that the hypothesis of Kahneman and Tversky is not supported; furthermore, we
have also found that people are markedly influenced by their own disposable income.
Inconsistencies and Different Perceptions
Behaviour may be influenced if utility of money is involved, if payments are much bigger, or if
initial situations are perceived (presented) differently. It might be the same people who avoid a2* and
seek a4*, i.e., avoid winning an extra 250 (as expected value) but seek to lose another 250. It is not
inconsistent as it compares the behaviour of the same person in two different settings (one with already a
reasonable amount of money, the other with an unbearable loss). That changes the alternatives at stake
and influences their behaviour switching their decision. It is important to note that judgements can only
be seen with the related alternatives at stake. Thus, it is not feasible to compare a2* and a4*directly.
One can now change the alternative involved to trace the consequences thereof. If we consider
the offer to win a very high (but improbable) prize compared to a small amount to pay (as in the state
lottery), we will see that a lot of people are risk-seeking in this winning (in the sense of Kahneman, &
Tversky) situation. On the other hand, if a potential (but improbable) high loss can be “balanced” by a
relatively small amount of money as in an insurance contract (which is very popular nowadays as people
try to get a contract on nearly everything to eliminate uncertainty) in losing situations, we see evidence
that they are risk-averse in losing situations (again in the Kahneman, & Tversky sense).
The two latter findings about the ubiquity of games of chance (and betting) and the popularity of
insurance contracts show a distinct deviation from what Kahneman and Tversky claim and gives our
reformulation more justification. Winning or losing is not a predicate for a situation that can be
unambiguously granted. It is always a matter of reconstruction of the situation involved. Rather than to
regard a situation as winning or losing situation, one might focus better on the original status (initial
wealth) of the test person. If a person earns 1,000 per month or 5,000 it does affect the decision; it might
influence it much more than the various amounts that are at stake; similarly, if a person has great debts
already with no perspective to fulfil them, this person might be willing to accept risks that other persons
would find completely irrational; indeed that is the basis for some gamblers. Also, these “facts” indicate
that people do not focus so much on probabilities but much more on the impact related to the potential
outcomes.
The preceding considerations also indicate that it is difficult to separate between the perception
of impact and probability of future outcomes. Personal criteria come to the fore. In a winning situation,
beliefs like “I deserve it (to win the prize and lead a happy life)” let people gamble (seek the risk) and
wait for “God’s decision”. In a losing situation, they are willing to pay an amount of protection money
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to ease out “God’s enragement” to avoid not only the “accident” but also the negative consequence
related to it that goes beyond the financial loss. The personality is a further factor that influences
decisions under uncertainty; it is possible that women – on the average – have a distinct risk profile from
men. All these considerations reveal how difficult it is to weight the evidence rationally. Gigerenzer
(2007) investigates the effect of gut decisions on the quality of decisions: first, gut decisions are popular;
second, they are not necessarily worse than careful analysis of all givens; third, it might be good to
support quicker decisions by checklists about what to consider. A mixture between analysis and gut
decisions might be superior to pure analytic decisions not only because of the undue delay in decision by
careful analysis including collecting all the necessary information.
A final example about personal criteria refers to the three-door problem with the two goats and
the car behind the doors where the candidate can freely choose one. After the candidate has made the
choice, the moderator opens one of the remaining doors to show a goat and offers the option to change
the first choice, i.e., to switch to the still closed door or remain with that door selected first. Borovcnik
(2012) discusses various feasible strategies to analyse the problem and whether it is advantageous to
change one’s first choice. Of course, by switching the candidate increases the chances to win the car
from 1/3 to 2/3. However, with all the explanations, people – in the majority – stubbornly remain with
their first choice even if they are fully capable to understand the solution. The discussion is signified by
fierce emotional expressions so that one may ask for the reason behind. One simple explanation to refute
all mathematical solutions might be that the candidates simply compare the situations afterwards and
relate a strong impact to these: to stay with the first choice and to lose will leave them as unlucky; they
simply had not a “fair chance” to win the car; to lose the car if they had chosen the right door and to
switch to the remaining door will leave them with the irony of friends and with the feeling that they
should not challenge God’s will. They do not compare risks in the sense of (3) or weighted risk in the
sense of (4); no, they simply compare the impact of their decision. And the impact of losing by their
action and being responsible for this is by far the worst they can imagine. Therefore, they defend their
first choice against all odds.
Idiosyncratic criteria, gut feelings, fear of high loss in the worst case, eager, responsibility for
what one does (as compared to bad luck) always overlays a rational approach; it starts with hindering to
separate the impact from the (small) probability of occurrence; it biases the perception of the (small)
probabilities of adverse events; and it increases the factual impact of the adverse event and focuses on
the worst case letting any weighting seem irrational and unfeasible.
The Logic of Repeated Decisions and One-Off Decisions
In a statistical variant of experiments 1 and 2, a candidate has to decide repeatedly (1,000 times)
between the presented options. Instead of performing the experiment, we just tell what we would do and
give a rationale for it. What would the reader decide in the situations presented in Table 5? Again, utility
may play a role but as the payments are so small, more or less the amount counts (this argument might
not apply if the single amounts were higher). We decide for the risky option b2 in the winning situation
of experiment 1s and for option b3 in the losing situation of experiment 2s. Thus we seek the risk in the
winning situation and avoid the risk in the losing situation (terms applied in the sense of Kahneman, &
Tversky), which is different from our behaviour in the non-statistical variant of the experiment. We will
not transform the situation relative to the “left” side but give a statistical argument that should suffice.
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Experiment 1s: Win [in $]
Potential future
Experiment 2s: Win [in $]
Potential future

Option b1
1
Option b3
−1

Option b2
2,5 with ½
0 with ½
Option b4
−2,5 with ½
0 with ½

Table 5. Statistical variant of experiments 1 and 2: 1,000 games have to be played; each requires a
decision between the two given options
To win an amount of more than 1,000 in the first experiment, we need to win in more than 400
single situations. The probability can be easily calculated from the binomial distribution (with n = 1,000
and p = ½) to a figure, which is close to 1 (1–10-10). We have a probability of at least 0.51 to win 1,247!
For the losing situation now the results are just reversed: we have a probability of nearly 1 to lose more
than 1,000 and we lose 1,247 with a probability of at least 0.51.
It makes a difference in terms of the success of the strategy used if one has a one-off decision or
decides similar cases repeatedly. What is good in a one-off decision may be bad for the repeated
decision. In other words, to speak with an illustrative context: if one sells a house one time, the relevant
criteria differ from those if one sells houses every week like a professional agent; this is not because of
the impersonal impact but because of doing it repeatedly; of course, a professional agent has additional
criteria for decisions, too.
Three Paradigmatic Examples of Risk
In the following three examples, we present the genuine character of situations under uncertainty
and discuss various useful strategies. The criteria used are not always defensible and they have their
relative merits and disadvantages. Of course, the decision based on a specific criterion will depend on it
and possibly switch if the criterion is changed. If probabilities are involved in the decisions, their values
can change even in the same problem for the various stakeholders involved. There is no unique view of
a problem; rationality depends also on the position of a stakeholder in a decision. Decisions under
uncertainty – if not “played against nature” may also be interpreted as an exchange of certainty and
money between the stakeholders as is typically done in an insurance contract, which is a generalization
from bets within games of chance.
Example 1. Insurance – Exchange Money for Certainty
We will embed matters in a decision with two stakeholders that exploit different types of
information for their decision. In any insurance contract, two partners mutually exchange money and the
status of uncertainty. For a full-coverage insurance for the car (for one year), the insurance company
gives up its position of certainty (no loss) and offers to pay the potential costs from an accident while the
client pays a certain amount (the premium) in advance in order to leave the situation of uncertainty (of
an accident) and reach a status of certainty over the financial cost of an accident. A similar situation
occurs in any bet in the state lottery, bets in sports, or with option contracts in the financial market.
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If both parties apply the same principles then the question arises how can the contract be
advantageous for both – it seems like a paradoxical situation. However, both stakeholders have their
own viewpoint and use different criteria that fit their circumstances better. The insurance company has
many contracts and thus can use the frequencies of accidents from past statistics to estimate the
underlying probabilities. Since the company accumulates assets, it is free of utility considerations. The
client, however, is a unique person with different habits (driving skills, driving regions, exposition to
special risks, etc.), which emerge into a personal judgement of probabilities of accidents. Furthermore,
the client does not have large financial assets so that utility considerations of money become relevant,
e.g., can one afford the cost of another new car within one year in the worst case of an accident? It is
interesting that states normally have no insurance for their cars. They have a larger fleet of cars and they
have a different financial background. We discuss a crude model for the potential future of one year
considering only a total wreckage or no accident below (Borovcnik 2006; see Table 6).
Cost (€)
Potential future

a1 = Insurance yes

a2 = No insurance

t1 = No accident

1,000

0

t2 = Total wreckage

1,000

30,000

Table 6. A crude model for the insurance contract
The insurance company may base its model on money and an estimate of the probability for the
damages (and related payments) by past frequencies of events. For data of 2% for the wreckage the
calculation is: 30,000⋅0.02 + 0⋅0.98 = 600 plus ... expenses and profit. The car owner has to find his or
her personal probabilities and take utility of money into consideration. Without utility, a so-called breakeven point can avoid the difficult process of eliciting the personal probabilities. The break-even here is
for odds of 1 : 29 for the total wreckage as in this case the decisions for the insurance or against it each
have the same cost, namely 1,000 so that the person (not considering utility) would be indifferent
between the two actions. If the model considers also smaller accidents (parking damages, e.g.) taking
out the insurance becomes more attractive.
Example 2. Using Probabilities for Optimization of a Decision under Uncertainty
We illustrate how a person willing to model uncertain future outcomes by probabilities may
optimize a current decision. Suppose the demand D for a journal is uncertain. We model it – for reasons
of simplicity – by the following discrete probabilities pi. Cost of production C(aj) (in €) is dependent on
units aj which are printed, as given in Table 7. The selling price of one issue of the journal is € 1.60.
How many units should be printed if you have a choice to print 1, 2, ..., or 5 thousand copies?
Demand di

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

Probabilities pi

0,40

0,30

0,20

0,06

0,04

Copies aj

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

Cost C(aj)

2,000
2,200
2,400
2,600
Table 7. Probabilities for demand for the journal and cost of copies

2,800

Calculation of the Expected Profit of a Single Decision. The cost is determined by the decision
but the income remains subject to randomness. We might calculate its expected value in the sense of (4)
in order to judge the present decision. We get a monetary value but cannot interpret it in isolation; we
will have to calculate the expected profit also for the other possible actions and then compare the values.
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Decision a2: 2,000 copies with cost C(aj) = 2,200
Demand di

Probabilities pi

1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000

Gross income

0.40
0.30
0.20
0.06
0.04

Net profit
−600
1,000
1,000
1,000
1,000

1,600
3,200
3,200
3,200
3,200

Expected profit (aj)

360

Maximum loss (aj)

−600

Table 8. Calculation of the consequences of a specific decision
The first entry of the net profit in Table 8 is –600 as when only 1,000 copies are sold, then the
net profit is 1,000 ⋅ 1.6 – 2,200 = –600. It is important to note that an action cannot be judged in
isolation: how could we interpret the expected profit of 360, or a maximum of loss of –600? A rational
judgement requires the comparison of alternatives. Thus, we repeat the analysis for alternative numbers
of copies (1,000 to 5,000) and arrange the results of computations in a combined matrix of net profits
below (Table 9).
Comparing Different Decisions. We compare our options with respect to the number of copies
according to the criterion of expected profit (rather than money we could also use utility of money).
Demand di

Net profit of decision: Number of copies aj
1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

Probabilities pi

0.40
−400
−600
−800
−1,000
−1,200
1,000
800
600
400
0.30
−400
1,000
2,400
2,200
2,000
0.20
−400
1,000
2,400
3,800
3,600
0.06
−400
1,000
2,400
3,800
5,200
0.04
−400
Cost C(aj)
2,000
2,200
2,400
2,600
2,800
Price per issue
Expected profit (aj)
360
640
600
464
−400
1.60
Maximum loss (aj)
−400
−600
−800
−1,000
−1,200
Table 9. Matrix of net profit depending on the decisions and the actual demand
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000

The second column of Table 9 contains the random variable profit for the option of 2,000 copies,
which was already displayed in Table 8. Other entries are calculated analogously. The probabilities for
the entries in the second row are derived from those for the demand (they are contained in the outmost
right column). According to the options we compare five different distributions for the profit; we could
write them in separate tables and draw their bar graphs. As the probabilities are the same, we write the
distributions compactly in the profit matrix.
It is obvious that no one would be willing to decide for option 1,000 as – whatever the demand
will be – it will lead to a loss of −400. This reminds us to a principle of avoiding a sure loss (which is a
basic principle in SJT). The option 2,000 delivers a positive expected profit of 360; however, it can lead
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also to an even higher loss of –600 as compared with the decision for 1,000 copies. This reflects a basic
property of improving decisions under risk. Rarely can one find decisions, which are better throughout
(whatever will happen), but it is easy to rule out inferior decisions. However, the remaining (admissible)
actions cannot be compared to each other without a further criterion and what is the better decision
depends on the criterion used. To improve a situation in one respect (to have a higher expected net
profit) is accompanied by the risk of higher potential losses. One may even speak of an invariant in
human life as seen from a general philosophical perspective on risk. The option 3,000, which yields an
expected profit of 640, is better. However, it bears the risk of a loss of –800 (if demand is only 1,000,
which has a probability of 0.40). It turns out that option 3,000 yields the maximum expected profit (640)
and is – in the present model – the best decision.
The decision depends on the criterion used. If the criterion for the decision would be to minimize
the maximum possible loss, then option 1,000 copies would be the best but this is not a feasible option at
all. A minimax principle (minimizing the maximal possible loss) thus may lead to nonsensical decisions.
Again, a general comparison is that fearing the maximum loss will often end up with a poor decision. If
probabilities are modelled for the demand for copies of the journal (e.g., from past relative frequencies),
then an expected profit criterion may be applied. Generally, this leads to better solutions but bears the
risk of somewhat higher losses. In this way the Bayesian view would use risk in the sense of (4). The
distribution of the demand is usually the result of validating a prior distribution on the demand by
empirical data via the Bayesian formula and has a SJT character. Instead of basing the calculations on
money, we could also attribute a utility to the different amounts of money.
Example 3. Medical Diagnosis
Medical diagnosis is a natural context to introduce conditional probabilities and reflect on the
possible errors of making decisions. Suppose we have data from a group of 1,000 persons (see Table 10)
about the cross-classification of their joint status of a disease D and the result of a biometric variable that
is used to classify them as positive (T +) or negative (T −). The question is whether the result of the
diagnosing variable can be used for diagnosing the disease or not.
Status of disease
D
Not-D

Diagnosis

All

T

+

9

99

108

T

−

1

891

892

All
10
990
1,000
Table 10. Data from an investigation in the disease D and a diagnosing method to detect D.
We imagine that each of the persons corresponds now to a ball that has two markers, one for the status
of the disease and the other for the result of the diagnosis. We put all the balls into an urn and draw from
it randomly. We get the following probabilities, which are easily read off Table 10:
a. P( D) =

10
108
9
= 0.0100 ; P(T + ) =
= 0.1080 , P( D ∩ T + ) =
= 0.0090 .
1000
1000
1000

b. P(T + | D) =

9
99
= 0.9000 as compared to P (T + | Not − D) =
= 0.1000 .
10
990

c. P( D | T + ) =

9
1
= 0.0833 as compared to P( D | T − ) =
= 0.0011.
892
108

TME, vol. 12, no. 1,2&3, p. 131

We will use the name prevalence (incidence) for the probability of the disease. We can speak of
the probability of a positive diagnosis to be 0.1080 in a. In b., we compare the probability of a positive
diagnosis within “subgroup” D (0.9000; first column) to the analogue probability in “subgroup” Not-D
(0.1000; second column) and state that the likelihood to get a positive result is 9 times larger in the
group who have the disease D than in the group of people who do not have the disease. We can also give
a name to the probability of a positive result T + in group D: this is the sensitivity of the diagnosing
method. Its complementary probability is linked to an error of the diagnosis; here we have an error rate
of 0.1000; i.e., on average we will not detect 10% of those who have the disease (as they get a negative
result T −). On the other hand, we can state that the diagnosis T + is wrongly attributed to a person
without the disease with probability 0.1000. The complimentary probability is called the specifity of the
diagnosis and it reflects the “reliability” that a person without D gets a correct negative result.
The context illustrates that diagnosing for the disease (or for the absence of the disease) is linked
to risk. We can make two errors in deciding that a positive person has the disease and a negative person
does not have the disease D. We can wrongly classify a person as to have the disease (first row, second
entry) and we can wrongly classify a person not to have the disease (second row, first entry). The size of
the errors, i.e., the probability of the errors characterizes the quality of the diagnosing procedure and
whether the underlying biometric variable should be used for diagnosing D. Usually, the prevalence is
estimated and the sensitivity and specificity are checked by a laboratory study of cases which are
classified by other methods so that we certainly know of these persons their status of D. If we reformulate the diagnosing problem as a statistical test of the null hypothesis “to have not D” and the
alternative hypothesis “to have D”, then the false positives (1 minus specifity) becomes the error of type
I while (1 minus sensitivity) becomes the error of type II.
Elementary Approaches to Probability and Risk
Probabilities, especially conditional probabilities are difficult to perceive and hard to estimate
and interpret in a specific context. Also, such probabilities reflect that we explore a real situation only
via models that need not fit to it. There are interesting proposals to simplify the probabilistic data and to
visualize them so that the information is more readable.
Gigerenzer’s Tables with Natural Numbers
Gigerenzer (2002) has suggested the use of absolute numbers instead of (conditional)
probabilities. All analyses are then based on these “natural frequencies” and are simplified to divide two
numbers (in the sense of APT; see also Table 10). His research team has also investigated, which
visualization is better to obtain and understand the solution, which is usually derived from calculations
that are rarely understood (and are based on the Bayesian formula).
Suppose the data for the screening scheme for the detection of breast cancer are the following
(Table 11; Gigerenzer, 2002): Of women between 40 and 50, 0.8% conceive cancer of the mammae
yearly; we call this prevalence (incidence) of the disease. From those who have breast cancer, 87.5% are
detected by anomalies in the mammogram (this is the sensitivity of the diagnosing procedure), i.e.,
diagnosed positive; from those who do not have breast cancer, 7% are also diagnosed positive indicating
falsely that they have cancer (the specifity is 93%). In a probabilistic framework, a woman is randomly
selected from the population and undergoes the mammogram. After she has a positive result, the
question is what is the conditional probability to have cancer of the breast. An analogue question can be
put after the mammogram is negative: what is this person’s probability to have no cancer of the breast
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given that the mammogram is negative? The answer can be obtained by the Bayesian formula, which is
quite formal. Gigerenzer suggests transforming all (conditional) probabilities to natural frequencies
(expected values) for a group of 1,000 or more persons.
Status
D
T

+

T

−

All

8

Not-D

Status
All

1,000

Prevalence (Prior): P( D) = 0.008 = 0.8 % ;

D

Not-D

All

T

+

7

70

77

T

−

1

922

923

All

8

992

1,000

Sensitivity: P(T + | D) = 0.875 = 87.5 % ;
Specifity:

P(T − | not - D) = 0.93 = 93 % .

Table 11. Transforming (conditional) probabilities to natural frequencies by expected numbers in
a statistical village
We round off the value of 922.56 to 922 for simplicity. The other data can just be filled by the
usual side constraints. From the table of natural frequencies we can calculate any probability related to
7
the diagnosis. If we restrict the selection to the first row, we read P( D | T + ) =
= 9.09 % , if we
77
922
restrict the selection to the second row, we obtain P(not - D | T − ) =
= 99.89 % . Remarkably, the
923
positive diagnosis has an unexpectedly low conditional probability for the disease, because of its low
prevalence. The advantage of Gigerenzer’s approach is that the formalism of Bayes’ formula is
circumvented and the final result is more convincing as only 7 from 77 positive diagnoses relate to
women with breast cancer. In fact, Gigerenzer suggests that the expected numbers are arranged in a tree
diagram instead of two-way tables as was done here.
Spiegelhalter’s Icon Arrays
Spiegelhalter (2014) uses natural frequencies and presents each of the persons (units) in the
statistical village by an icon. In his icon array he systematically compares the expected numbers of two
scenarios, one with the screening scheme applied and the other without over a longer period (see Figure
1). This allows judging the benefit of the screening as compared to a decision for not undergoing the
screening regime. Data in Table 12 display the expected numbers and illustrate the effect of PSA
screening and digital rectal examination; numbers are for men aged 50 years or older, not participating
vs. participating in screening for 10 years (1,000 men in each group).
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1,000 men without
screening

Category of outcome
Men dying from prostate cancer

1,000 men with
screening

8

8

192

192

Men diagnosed for prostate cancer
and treated unnecessarily

−

20

Men without cancer that got a false
alarm and a biopsy

−

180

800

600

1,000

1,000

Men dying from other causes

Men that are unharmed and alive
All

Icon
used

Table 12. Expected numbers of diverse outcomes in a ten year screening scheme applied to 1,000 men
as compared to the outcome of no screening (exact figures are slightly smoothed here)
1,000 men without screening:
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Figure 1. Icon array to illustrate the expected outcome for the prostate screening system as compared to
no screening (from Spiegelhalter, 2014)
In the usual format one has to learn to read the information (and the formalism). Many formats in
scientific communication hide more than they clarify the inherent information. Thus, there is an urgent
need for elementary approaches. However, there are also disadvantages: The basic assumption in the
approach of natural numbers is that people are all alike. On the one side there is a psychological barrier
to accept such an averaging view. On the other side, there are not 1,000 men who are like me (as is
suggested in the icon array). The data and the derived results when enhanced by the visual
representation appear as factual and true. The key point is that whole numbers or visual representations
of them can appear to give more validity than is appropriate as models and imprecise information are
used. Both the probability of prostate cancer (the prevalence) and the sensitivity and specifity of the
diagnosing procedures used in the screening regime are crude estimates for the underlying probabilities.
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Odds and Probabilities
We can use odds for calibrating (tuning) our personal probability in the sense of SJT. Odds are
the proportion of the probabilities that “E occurs to E fails to occur”, i.e., P( E ) : P( E ) . Odds for a six on
a die are 1 : 5 and for a head on a coin, the odds are 1 : 1 (fifty-fifty). From odds, the probability may be
recalculated by P( E ) = p +p q so that P(six) = 1 +1 5 = 16 .
In the diagnosing example from above we have prior odds for the disease of 8 : 992 or roughly
1 : 120. The probability of a positive diagnosis T + is 7/8 in the subgroup with D, and is only 70/992 in
the subgroup without the disease D whence we state that the data likelihood for a positive diagnosis T +
equals 7/8 : 70/992, or roughly 12 to 1; this expresses the fact that a positive result has a probability that
is 12 times higher in the subgroup of women with breast cancer (D) than in the breast cancer-free group
( D ). The formalism of the Bayes’ formula can be reduced to multiply prior odds and data likelihood
(see Borovcnik, 2012).
We represent the odds by fractions and multiply as if the factors are scaling factors for the odds
(in the same way as scaling factors are multiplied in copying a sheet of paper repeatedly, scaling the
intermediate copy up or down, to obtain the final scaling factor):

1
12
1
, which yields posterior
×
=
120
1
10

odds for D given the positive result T +. The simplified posterior odds of 1 : 10 yield a posterior
probability for D of 1/11, or 0.0909. The advantage of this calculus with probabilities is that we can
identify the low prior odds of the prevalence to cause the surprisingly low probability to have breast
cancer after a positive result. The diagnosing procedure per se is not very good but the data likelihood of
T + increases prior odds by a factor of 12, which is not bad at all.
Evaluating and Sharing Risks between Different Stakeholders

Apart from personal risks, one may differentiate risks to the field where they arise (gambling,
investments, etc.) or to those who are involved: single persons, or the society as a whole. In the latter
case we might speak of societal risk. Climate change is a classic example of societal risk. Risks in
medicine are harder to classify as there are single patients who are at risk but there is also an
institutional side involved. The institutional side has its own goals which may differ from that of each
individual.
Risks Shared between Stakeholders of Different Levels
For example, in public health there may be a discussion whether children should be vaccinated
against measles or not. The health system is concerned about public order and is responsible to prevent
an epidemic outbreak of the disease. It can build a frequentist scenario and weigh the different
possibilities by probabilities and calculate the risks involved in wide-spread vaccination (possibly with a
duty to partake) and reduced vaccination (no public financial support, no advertisement and counselling
of parents). The individual parents have their subjective probabilities (own experience with the disease,
strength of immune system, alternative ways to support health and cure in case of a disease, etc.). They
cannot rely on the frequentist probability of the public health system, and the impact is hard to judge: the
possible impact of the disease and the possibility of a bad consequence of the vaccination itself. While
the parents stay with the personal consequences in either case, the doctor can be made liable for not
informing about the possibility of the vaccination (or its negative side-effects). The pharma industries
are a further stakeholder in this case, which has completely different financial interests and goals. We
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can see from this description that such decisions cannot be prescribed but have to be made personally,
with all the assistance of public information that relates to the current state of medicine. For the different
situations of the stakeholders in case of the recent HPV vaccination (that is intended to protect from
cervical cancer) see Borovcnik and Kapadia (2011a).
Medical doctors enhance and increase their role by warning on health risks. With these warnings
they are always on the safe side. If the patient follows their advice and the negative consequences do not
occur, their concern seems justified; but if the patient still suffers from some consequences, there may be
many other explanations and still the doctor’s concern proves right. If the patient does not follow their
advice and gets “ill”, this seems again to be a confirmation of the doctor’s concern; if the patient does
not experience the negative outcome in this case, there will yet remain a reminder (you were only
lucky!).
Societal Risks – Standards of Science and Society
In technological settings, the evaluation of risks has become a driving force to develop related
concepts. While it seems desirable to keep technological risks as small as possible, economic reasons
would be a “natural” limitation. And, there are no absolutely safe technologies so that the key question
becomes whether we can reasonably decrease the risk.
When risk considerations are applied to complex systems (climate, ecosystems, world economy,
etc.), the systems contain so many components so that their interactions become practically
unpredictable. Whether climate change really establishes a risk remains doubtful for many people. The
probabilities for the various developments are hard to assess and may be changed by time, technology,
and economics. Many attempts are undertaken to simulate models (scenarios) on the basis of
assumptions (with the well-known effects of flooding, increase of hurricanes, etc.) lacking serious
attempts to estimate the probabilities of certain quantitative effects. The models resemble scenarios
(what happens if …?) and cannot claim the status of a precise description of the real world as too many
weakly supported hypotheses play a key role in their considerations.
This example reveals a key problem in presenting scientific results to the public. Standards that
are viable within research may not be applicable for that generalization especially as the stakeholders
have their own probabilities and are affected by the consequences completely differently. And there are
dynamic developments involved that cannot be influenced further. For example, once there is a public
decision for the energy use of atomic power, there are industries involved in the business and make their
profit while on the other hand the public has to balance if an accident happens (as in Fukushima 2011,
with the potential harm on health but also financially to cope with the damage).
The terms “objective” risk (when objective probabilities are involved) and “subjective” risk
(when subjective probabilities are involved) are misleading, especially if the risk has to be shared
between stakeholders of different levels. The calculated risks are only a support for finding a common
decision but never can be used in the way that decisions are executed. Apart from the risk as it is per se,
there is a perception of risk that is not based on (well-calibrated) subjective probabilities but more or
less on intuitive short-cuts of such a risk calculation, which is based on beliefs and gut feelings.
When scientific results should be applied to other areas, especially to public decisions in society,
we have to clarify the standards of evidence. In sciences, one essential strategy is to find hypotheses of
specific relations between variables by rejecting a null hypothesis (that there are no such specific
relations) and the type I error (of falsely rejecting the null) becomes vital. However, in applications a
specific hypothesis has to be applied and the type II error of wrongly not rejecting the null hypothesis
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(of no special relations) becomes the nub of considerations. What if this type II error is very small? Then
it might be very easy for an alternative hypothesis of special relations to get acknowledged by rejecting
the null. We have dealt with these types of errors in a separate section earlier as they form part of the
inner-mathematical approach towards risk within hypothesis testing.
Here an example illustrates matters. If a null hypothesis is rejected (because of a moderate or
larger type I error), then one would establish a special relation between variables and use such a model
for further action. What if this superimposed model were inadequate? Matters are complicated as
nowadays it has become a standard to acknowledge empirical evidence as evidence for action. That
means if data suggest a special relation, researchers usually leave out the next step of research, namely
to find a substantial explanation from the context sciences for the special relation that has been prima
facie found on statistical evidence. That would imply to build a functional (causal) model of
interrelations between variables. One example here is the endeavour of the last two decades to find
biomarkers that allow for early diagnosis of cancer of various types. Any association or correlation
between such a biometric variable and the frequency of cancer has been taken seriously and investigated
with millions of measurements and researches but – apart from Herceptin for breast-cancer
(Breastcancer.org, n.d.) – with no apparent success. Medical researchers have not built a more refined
model of the human metabolism (as in the Herceptin case) to explain the correlation (that has been
found) on a context level.
It remains an open issue how to reconcile the standards of science and public implementation of
scientific results. The institutional barrier between the stakeholders and the hugely differing interests are
only two key elements that cause difficulties. 	
  There are further vital elements. There is the difference in
information between stakeholders. The available frequentist (more objectivist) information might not be
relevant for the single persons. Different criteria applied to the accessible information determine the
decision. In the context of the journal copies we have illustrated the minimax principle (minimizing
maximum loss) and optimizing expected values in the sense of (4). In general, these criteria lead to
different decisions. Furthermore, there is neither universal agreement on such criteria nor a generally
accepted scientific argument that one is superior over the others. The criteria fit different purposes,
which can be related to tasks that involve risk.
Implications
Language is a highly sensitive issue for all activities in education and the problems are even
more relevant in the case of probability and risk. The differing usage of risk has to be addressed in
teaching explicitly. The diverse applications may help to enhance what is meant in each case and which
connotation the ingredients have so that the results may be evaluated accordingly. The use of the term
risk within statistical inference (both in the classical test and in the Bayesian framework) makes issues
precise but has to struggle with two main problems:
i., the logic of statistical inference is complicated and misunderstood, which makes the terms
more of a myth than precise.
ii., the use is different from everyday language and different from use in the context of economy
and technical safety considerations. The overlap with everyday meaning and use of risk
completes the description of the educational challenge.
To impose the technical jargon and meaning of risk to everyday use requires that the technical
and mathematical concepts behind are fully perceived, which cannot be expected from the majority of
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students. Can changing the technical concepts be a viable alternative to prepare them better to everyday
usage? Would we end up with a different statistics methodology, or new probabilistic and statistical
concepts that are more suitable for the purpose of the individual? Or should we approach the problem
from a more individualistic perspective from teaching and learning and yet aim to perceive the
traditional concepts: increase the awareness of overlap in meaning, purpose, and naming the problems
and concepts, and get alert to the wider use of similar wordings and notions in everyday contexts?
Psychological problems to separate between probability and utility have their consequences on
proposals to introduce risk and utility considerations from early teaching onwards. Carefully chosen and
deliberately discussed examples might help to clarify issues. Further psychological factors seem to be:
•The representation of a situation as win or loss influences decisions.
•The personal status of wealth seems to be vital but is largely unexplored.
•Rather than regarding the probability of the adverse events, people regard the impact of
outcomes and possibly focus only on the worst case.
•Low probabilities are badly handled and provoke a shift in focus on impact (maximum loss)
rather than evaluating a weighted risk in the sense of (4).
•Impact of various outcomes is reduced to impact in the worst case.
•Cumulative risk is often ignored though it may be relevant.
Constituents of risk are decisions; comparisons of decisions are easier to handle (and impose a
partial ordering on various actions) than to understand a value attached to a single decision. How good
an action is depends on the alternatives that are feasible. This fact can also be used manipulatively (by
pre-set alternatives or reducing alternatives on purpose). We recapitulate some of our main themes.
a. The approach to probability (APT, FQT, SJT) to evaluate the outcomes (of which the adverse
event is but one) regulates the character of calculated risks. However, seemingly more objective
information might be useful for an institutional stakeholder but of little help for an individual.
b. The evaluation of the impact of the outcome may be in terms of money (win or loss),
dichotomic (0 for correct decision and 1 for wrong decision), by utility of outcome, or even by
idiosyncratic ways in judging specific unwanted events (as, e.g., in the three-door problem).
c. One-off decisions and repeated situations do require a different logic, which confuses and
might provoke a focus on subsidiary “information”.
d. Criteria used for decisions vary, e.g., for different stakeholders and are often very personal.
Statistical information is abstract and often ignored while personal experience is vivid and tends
to be overestimated; maximum loss seems more convincing than abstract weighting of impact by
probabilities in the sense of (4).
The stakeholders’ position has a definite impact on risk calculations and the decisions to make.
There seems to be a clash for the logic of risk as implementation of considerations is different for the
stakeholders; recommendations are also interest-driven rather than neutral in a scientific sense and differ
also by diverse liabilities within systems (e.g., the health system, medical doctors, the individual patient,
his or her relatives). What is rational and good for one stakeholder needs not be rational for another
stakeholder, at least the connotation of the used concepts changes as does the information that can
sensibly be used. Similar difficulties arise in risk-sharing in technological environments.
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There are many topics that seem rewarding to put on the agenda, to ask back, and to find more
time to clarify issues. Of course, it depends on the background of the learners whether such additional
discussions are helpful for them. The many aspects of a concept may also confuse them. However, at
least the teacher has to be aware of the circumstance that people have their private concepts (and which
ones they have), that the use in everyday terms is ambiguous and diverse, and that even experts have
widely diverging concepts and their own specific terminology. Not the least important element to note –
experts also have their own interests and have to be challenged whether their advice can be taken as
neutral. Statistics education is well-advised to be careful about the ways to teach issues of risk so that
students can develop their own concepts and recognize the influential factors of their decisions as well
as decisions that are made on a societal level for them.
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